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Personal Sovereignty and Our Moral Rights to
Non-Interference
October 15, 2015
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of
deontology against a criticism raised by Michael Otsuka.
The paradox of deontology revolves around the question whether it should
always be permissible to infringe someone’s right to non-interference when this
would serve to minimize the overall number of comparable rights infringements
that occur. According to the inviolability approach, rights to non-interference
protect and give expression to our personal sovereignty, which is not advanced
through the minimization of rights infringements. This seems to dissolve the
paradox. Otsuka, however, contends that the proposed solution may rely on
too narrow an understanding of personal sovereignty. He suggests that personal
sovereignty may come with an enforceability dimension that undermines the
inviolability approach.
While I agree with Otsuka that enforceability is an important aspect of per-
sonal sovereignty, I argue that properly construed, the enforceability dimension
of personal sovereignty does not undermine the inviolability approach.
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, I defend the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of
deontology against a criticism raised by Michael Otsuka.
The paradox of deontology revolves around the question whether it should
always be permissible to infringe someone’s right to non-interference when this
would serve to minimize the overall number of comparable rights infringements
that occur. According to the inviolability approach, rights to non-interference
protect and give expression to our personal sovereignty, which is not advanced
through the minimization of rights infringements. This seems to dissolve the
paradox. Otsuka, however, contends that the proposed solution may rely on
too narrow an understanding of personal sovereignty. He suggests that per-
sonal sovereignty may come with an enforceability dimension that undermines
the inviolability approach. While I agree with Otsuka that enforceability is
an important aspect of personal sovereignty, I argue that properly construed,
the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty does not undermine the
inviolability approach.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I start by presenting the paradox
of deontology (section 2) and the inviolability approach (sections 3 and 4). I
then introduce Otsuka’s enforceability criticism (section 5), and argue that it
fails (section 6). In section 7, I discuss a criticism related to the enforceability
criticism, namely that rights are valuable only to the extent that we are able
to enforce them. I argue that this related criticism does not undermine the
inviolability approach either. Section 8 concludes.
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2 The Paradox of Deontology
Consider the following decision situation:
The Murder Trolley Case.1 A vicious killer has tied five people to a trolley
track and directed a runaway trolley towards them. You are standing on a
bridge across the track with a massive man standing next to you. You have
two options: you can either do nothing, in which case the trolley will hit and
kill the five. Alternatively, you can push the massive man from the bridge and
onto the tracks, in which case the trolley will hit him before it reaches the five.
This will crush and kill the massive man, but it will also bring the trolley to a
halt before it reaches the five. Is it morally permissible to push the massive man?
Most subjects faced with this question think it is not.2 They think that
the massive man has a right not to be killed, a right that is not permissibly
infringeable3 under the circumstances of the case. Can this view be justified?
One might think that the massive man has a right not to be killed because it
would be bad if he were killed. More generally, one might think that people
have rights against being killed because killings are bad, and, for that reason,
ought not to occur. Yet if this is correct, it seems that in the specific setup of
the Murder Trolley Case, you should in fact be permitted to push the massive
man. That way, you would be able to ensure that only one instead of five killings
occur, thus keeping the badness of what is happening to a minimum.
Robert Nozick has argued that the problem just raised applies to all moral
rights to non-interference.4 Rights to non-interference protect us by making it
impermissible to harm us against our consent. In doing this, they act as “side
constraints”5 on action: from any agent’s set of feasible alternatives, they elim-
inate as impermissible those actions which would infringe others’ rights. One
might suppose that rights6 rule out actions as impermissible on grounds that
these actions are bad and ought to be prevented. But if this were correct, rights
would have to follow a minimization logic: they would always and necessarily
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have to be permissibly infringeable for the sake of preventing more numerous
infringements of the same right. If they weren’t infringeable in this way, rights
would risk defeating their own purpose. However, if our intuitions about cases
such as the Murder Trolley Case are correct, rights do not in fact follow a
minimization logic. Instead, it is at least sometimes wrong to infringe a right
to keep a higher number of comparable rights from being infringed.
How can we resolve this inconsistency between the presumed purpose of
our rights to non-interference and our intuitive judgments about specific cases?
Should we accept that rights ought to follow a minimization logic, and dismiss
our intuitions about cases such as the Murder Trolley Case? Or is there a
way of understanding the purpose of rights that allows us to make sense of
our intuitive judgments? In line with standard terminology, I will refer to this
problem as the paradox of deontology. While Nozick suggested that an appeal to
our “inviolability”7 might provide the key to solving the paradox, it was Frances
Kamm8 who developed Nozick’s suggestions into the fleshed out inviolability
approach that will be presented in the next section.
3 The Inviolability Approach
The core idea of the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of deontology
is that rights put restrictions on action not primarily to prevent the occurrence
of something bad, but to protect and give expression to our inviolability. In
essence, our inviolability and our moral rights to non-interference9 are two
sides of the same coin. The smaller the set of circumstances under which it is
permissible to harm us against our consent, the more stringent our rights to non-
interference, and the more inviolable we are. If rights protect our inviolability,
there is thus nothing self-defeating about a right that must not be infringed for
the sake of preventing more numerous infringements of the same right—such a
right simply means that we are more inviolable than we would otherwise be.10
Inviolability forms part of the moral standing we enjoy as individuals, i.e.
our moral status. An individual’s moral status fixes how that individual should
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be treated; it delimits the kind of treatment the individual is owed. To respect
an individual’s moral status is to live up to the moral requirements that the
individual’s presence imposes on those around her.11
Inviolability as part of our moral status is a measure of our moral significance.
The more inviolable we are, the more stringent the moral constraints that others
have to observe when dealing with us, and the higher our significance. Kamm
puts the point as follows: “Individuals whose rights stand as a barrier to action
are more potent individuals than they would be otherwise. There being rights
and constraints with high thresholds is a mark that the person who has them
is a stronger, more valuable type of thing [. . . ].”12
Importantly, it does not lower our inviolability when someone violates our
rights, or harms us impermissibly. Nor does it promote our inviolability when
someone prevents our rights from being violated. It is the details of our moral
status that determine how inviolable we are, and these details remain the same
whether or not we are treated in accordance with them.13
To illustrate this with the Murder Trolley Case, consider the five people tied
to the track. If they are killed, they are thereby mistreated—because each of
the five has a certain moral status, the killer wrongs them by killing them for
his sadistic pleasure. By killing his victims, the murderer therefore disregards
their moral status. But to disregard someone’s moral status is not to lower it:
whether or not the five are killed, each of them is a morally significant being
who ought not to be killed for fun. Similarly to what goes for the murderer and
the five, whether you push the massive man does not affect his moral status.
His status is affected, however, by whether it is permissible to push him. Once
we have settled on an answer to this question, we have settled a fact about
his moral status, and, by extension, about the moral status of each of us (see
note 9). If it is impermissible to push him, the set of circumstances under
which morality condemns our being harmed against our consent is larger than
it would otherwise be, and we are more inviolable. Admittedly, if morality
condemns pushing the massive man, then respecting his inviolability comes at
the cost of the five people on the track having their rights violated. But this
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does not lower our inviolability, as it remains true that the five ought not to
have been killed. The murderer should neither have tied them to a track, nor
sent a trolley towards them. If you must not now push the fat man, morality
condemns the only available course of action that would save the five, but this
does not mean that it endorses their being killed. By analogy, the fact that you
must not cheat on an exam does not imply that it was admissible not to study
for it, or that there is nothing wrong with flunking it.
As sketched, the inviolability approach provides a possible solution to the
paradox of deontology, but it raises a number of questions as well. First, it is
not clear what reason we have to think of ourselves as highly inviolable. Is there
anything that could plausibly give rise to our moral status as highly inviolable
beings? Second, what is the point of having a moral status that makes it
wrong to harm us, when as a consequence of this, more of us may actually be
harmed? Third, our inviolability seems high, but it does not seem maximal.
What determines its limits? Unless these questions have satisfactory answers,
the inviolability approach fails to offer a compelling solution to the paradox.
4 Inviolability and Rational Agency
A long line of thinkers inspired by Kant argue that our stringent rights to non-
interference derive from and are justified by our capacity for rational agency,
which allows us to set goals for ourselves and act purposefully, thus enabling
us to live our lives in accordance with our own ideas of the good. Their basic
idea is that as rational creatures, we value high inviolability as a an important
aspect of our autonomy, not as a way of minimizing the harm that we must
expect to suffer. In Warren Quinn’s words:
“A person is constituted by his body and mind. They are parts
or aspects of him. For that very reason, it is fitting that he have
primary say over what may be done to them—not because such an
arrangement best promotes overall human welfare, but because any
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arrangement that denied him that say would be a grave indignity.
In giving him this authority, morality recognizes his existence as an
individual with ends of his own—an independent being. Since that is
what he is, he deserves this recognition. Were morality to withhold
it, were it to allow us to kill or injure him whenever that would be
collectively best, it would picture him not as a being in his own right
but as a cell in the collective whole.”14
Succinctly put, the point is this: high inviolability puts each of us in charge of
their own life by making us sovereign over the “territory” that consists of our
bodies and minds. Insofar as we are rational beings who aspire to autonomy,
this is something we value independently of its effects on our welfare.
If this is right—as I suppose it is—it may appear that we should be maxi-
mally inviolable, or that it should always be impermissible to interfere with us
against our consent. But Kamm has argued that this need not be the case, as our
rationality is not our only morally relevant feature.15 Another relevant feature
is sentience, or the fact that a human person is “a complex, feeling creature
who cares about whether it lives or dies.”16 It is plausible that our sentience
grounds a moral concern with what actually happens to us, thus underpinning
the idea that in cases such as the Murder Trolley Case, it should be morally
permissible to promote the general welfare by minimizing rights infringements.
Conflicts between respecting rights as constraints on action and minimizing
rights infringements can then be understood to reflect an underlying conflict
between the moral implications of our rationality and our sentience—the former
giving rise to the value of personal sovereignty, the latter grounding a concern
with the general welfare.17 Depending on the details of the case, either side may
prove more weighty.18 In the Murder Trolley Case, if it is impermissible to push
the massive man, personal sovereignty “wins out” against welfare considerations,
in the sense that from a moral point of view, it is more important to let the
massive man have the final say over what should happen to him than it is to
enable a net saving of four lives. Once we regard the Murder Trolley Case as
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such a conflict of values, we can see that there is nothing self-defeating about
resolving the conflict in favour of personal sovereignty.
5 The Enforceability Criticism
Once we employ the value of personal sovereignty to create a connection between
our rationality and the inviolability our rights to non-interference endow us with,
we are able to give plausible answers to a number of questions the inviolability
approach raises. But it is still not clear whether the inviolability approach
provides a viable solution to the paradox of deontology.
So far, I have argued—following Kamm and others—that high inviolability
puts us in charge of our lives by making us sovereign over the territory of our
bodies and minds. This suggests that “inviolability” and “personal sovereignty”
are interchangeable terms. But is this correct? Michael Otsuka argues that
“personal sovereignty” would seem to be a more encompassing concept than
“inviolability”.19 More specifically, he claims that personal sovereignty would
seem to include not only rights to non-interference, but rights to enforce such
rights as well.20
Otsuka’s claim seems conceptually correct. Suppose I harass another person
by shoving him around and punching him, thus disrespecting his rights. Now
suppose that the moral rules that governed us were such that neither my
victim—let us call him Bob—nor any bystanders had any right to try and
restrain me, or to fight back in one way or another. If under such circumstances
some bystanders came up to me and told me that I ought to stop harassing
Bob, they could appeal to Bob’s inviolability, but not to his sovereignty. They
could coherently argue that it is wrong to harass Bob because he is not violable
in this way; they could point out that Bob is a morally significant being who is
owed respectful and considerate treatment. But they would be confused if they
claimed that I was wrong to harass Bob because of the personal sovereignty he
enjoyed over the territory of his body and mind. Unlike inviolability, personal
sovereignty seems at least partly to consist of a moral authority to keep intruders
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in check. If we were all like beautiful flowers or newborn babies—beings that
it is wrong to violate, but who lack all ability to enforce their inviolability—it
would seem a category mistake to refer to us as “sovereign.” In other words,
it seems correct to say that an inviolable entity is sovereign only if someone
capable of defending it may at least sometimes rightfully do so.21
Otsuka argues that if he is right to suggest that personal sovereignty consists
of rights to non-interference as well as enforcement rights, then our sovereignty
increases not only with our inviolability, but also with our moral authority to
enforce this inviolability. He proposes to construe the enforceability dimension
of personal sovereignty as follows: first, our authority to defend ourselves would
seem to consist of and increase with the enforcement rights we have against
those who threaten to illegitimately interfere with us.22 Second, it would
also seem to consist of and increase with the rights we have against innocent
bystanders.23 Otsuka’s idea is that if there are certain ways in which we may
permissibly interfere with an innocent bystander to protect ourselves against
illegitimate interference, then the enforceability dimension of our sovereignty is
strengthened because we have more means available with which we may enforce
our inviolability. Lastly, Otsuka thinks that the enforceability dimension of
personal sovereignty extends to others intervening on our behalf.24 That is, he
suggests that our inviolability may become more enforceable as others have more
extensive rights to defend us against illegitimate interference, either by being
permitted to interfere with the attacker, or by being permitted to interfere with
innocent bystanders to shield us from the attack.25
Otsuka does not want to suggest that our sovereignty increases whenever
its enforceability dimension is strengthened. Instead, he points out that the
enforcement rights we have against innocent third parties strengthen the en-
forceability dimension of personal sovereignty while weakening its inviolability
dimension. Only if they strengthen its enforceability dimension more than they
weaken its inviolability dimension would they seem to make us overall more
sovereign. Put differently, Otsuka suggests that enforcement rights held against
third parties would seem to strengthen our overall sovereignty only subject to
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a proportionality constraint.26
With the help of the Murder Trolley Case, we can get a better grip on the
details of Otsuka’s conceptualization of personal sovereignty. To Otsuka, if it
is permissible to push the massive man, then there is a sense in which our
sovereignty would seem to increase even though our inviolability suffers. More
specifically, if you are permitted to intervene on behalf of the five people trapped
on the trolley track, you are authorized to enforce their rights not to be killed
via the means of harming the massive man, which—according to Otsuka—would
seem to strengthen the enforceability dimension of our sovereignty.
But what happens to our sovereignty all things considered? How are the
negative effects on inviolability to be traded off against the positive effects
on enforceability? Otsuka thinks that the inviolability dimension of personal
sovereignty appears slightly weightier than its enforceability dimension, so that
when “other things [are] equal,” inviolability “makes a greater contribution
to our personal sovereignty” than enforceability.27 His idea is that we are
more sovereign if it is impermissible to kill one innocent bystander in order
to enforce one other person’s right not to be killed. But once “other things are
not equal”—or once a fairly minimal principle of proportionality is respected—
Otsuka thinks that a strengthening of the enforceability dimension can result
in an increase in personal sovereignty even if that strengthening comes at the
cost of lower inviolability.28 By way of example, he thinks that the overall
effect on our sovereignty would seem to be positive if it became permissible to
“non-lethally maim one innocent bystander” to enforce another person’s right
not to be killed.29 Similarly, he appears to think that the overall effect on
our sovereignty would be positive if it became permissible to kill one innocent
bystander to enforce several other people’s rights not to be killed.30
In sum, Otsuka suggests that there are two dimensions to personal sovereignty,
an inviolability dimension and an enforceability dimension. The two can come
into conflict, in which case we can increase one only at the expense of the other.
To Otsuka, it seems that we maximize overall personal sovereignty if we resolve
such conflicts in favour of whichever dimension makes the weightier contribution
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to personal sovereignty given the details of the case.
If we accept Otsuka’s suggested conceptualization of personal sovereignty,
the inviolability approach is undermined. The inviolability approach depends
on the assumption that it strengthens personal sovereignty if our rights to non-
interference do not follow a minimization logic. But if Otsuka’s ideas are correct,
it weakens our sovereignty if our rights do not follow a minimization logic, as
the negative effects this has on the enforceability of our rights outweighs the
positive effects it has on our inviolability.
6 Why the Enforceability Criticism Fails
In this section, I argue that the enforceability criticism fails. While Otsuka is
right to insist on an enforceability dimension to personal sovereignty, he goes
wrong in suggesting to extend that dimension to enforcement rights held against
innocent third parties. Once this mistake is corrected, the enforceability dimen-
sion of personal sovereignty ceases to undermine the inviolability approach.
To see why the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty should not
extend to enforcement rights against innocent third parties, we need a better
understanding of the concept of personal sovereignty. In an attempt to gain such
an understanding, I will next turn to political philosophy, where the concept of
state sovereignty is well established.31
According to Dan Philpott, a sovereign state exercises “supreme authority”
within the borders of its territory, “but also, by definition, with respect to
outsiders, who may not interfere with the sovereign’s governance.”32 Philpott
notes that “quintessential modern sovereignty” is absolute, so that the state’s
authority extends “to all matters within [the state’s] territory, uncondition-
ally.”33 This fits well both with the general idea that there is an inviolability
dimension to personal sovereignty, and with the more specific claim that our per-
sonal sovereignty increases with the stringency of our rights to non-interference.
But what about the idea that there ought to be an enforceability dimension to
sovereignty? In a system of sovereign states, does each state have a right to
11
enforce its authority over its territory?
Hugo Grotius was the first political philosopher to provide a systematic
account of the natural law between sovereign states.34 In De Jure Belli ac
Pacis (published in 1625), Grotius argues that it is legitimate for a sovereign
state to wage war against a state that has attacked it. However, the victim state
must not involve neutral states in its war effort if they do not agree to being
involved, as neutral states may “rightly look to their own interests and stay on
the sidelines.”35 It seems that all commentators, from Grotius onwards, agreed
that victim states have certain enforcement rights against their attackers, but
none against uninvolved third parties.36 Why is this so? In a nutshell, because
enforcement rights against attackers, but not enforcement rights against third
party states, are compatible with the absolute sovereignty of states.
To see this more clearly, consider a system of absolutely sovereign states. In
such a system, each state enjoys exclusive authority over all matters within its
territory, and other states have a duty not to interfere with its governance. To
argue that a victim state has enforcement rights against third party states is
to deny that the third party states enjoy exclusive authority over all matters
within their territory, which amounts to denying that these states are absolutely
sovereign. Suppose a victim state (or another state choosing to come to the
victim’s aid) asks a neutral state’s consent to use some of the neutral state’s
resources in an effort to fight off an attacker state. Suppose the neutral state
denies access to its resources, as it does not wish to get involved. If the victim
state (or another state choosing to come to the victim’s aid) may nevertheless
go ahead and put the neutral state’s resources to use, then the neutral state
does not enjoy exclusive authority over all matters within its territory.
The situation is different when we are dealing with attacker states. An
attacker state has violated (or is threatening to violate) its duty not to interfere
with the exclusive authority that other states enjoy over their territory. By
choosing to overstep its authority, an attacker state makes itself liable to defen-
sive action: because it shows insufficient respect for the authority of others, it at
least temporarily loses some of the authority over its own territory so that order
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can be restored.37 Even in a system of absolutely sovereign states, each state’s
exclusive authority over its territory is thus conditional on respectful behaviour
towards others. But why refer to the sovereignty of states as “absolute” if
that sovereignty comes with a condition? The political philosophers’ choice of
terminology seems to me sensible in light of the fact that a state’s authority
over its territory remains exclusive (i) independently of how the state handles
its internal affairs and (ii) independently of what happens around it. Whether
a state’s authority over its territory remains exclusive is in that sense entirely
within the state’s control.
In sum, the absolute sovereignty of states leaves conceptual room only for
enforcement rights held against liable attackers. For our purposes, this is inter-
esting in two ways. First, it suggests that absolute or “maximal” sovereignty is
not a matter of extensive enforcement rights. While some enforcement rights
against attackers seem necessary for sovereignty, we can refer to a state as
absolutely sovereign without having to suppose that its enforcement rights
are especially extensive or in some sense maximal. As long as a state has
sufficient enforcement rights, what determines the extent of its sovereignty
is simply the exclusivity of its authority over its territory, so that a state is
absolutely sovereign if its authority extends to all matters within its territory,
without exception. Exclusive authority over a territory thus sits at the core of
sovereignty ; enforcement rights play a mere supporting role.
Second, the fact that absolute sovereignty is incompatible with enforcement
rights against uninvolved third parties suggests that the existence of such rights
would not actually add to our sovereignty, but would instead detract from it. If
the core of sovereignty is exclusive rightful control over a territory, a measure
that encroaches on this core cannot boost sovereignty.
If we apply these insights to personal sovereignty, they suggest a revised
picture of the concept. According to this revised picture, our rights to non-
interference sit at the core of personal sovereignty. Personal sovereignty increases
with the stringency of our rights to non-interference, or with the exclusivity of
the authority we enjoy over our bodies and minds. If our sovereignty were
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absolute, our inviolability would be maximal—it would never be permissible to
interfere with us against our consent. But rights to non-interference do not
exhaust personal sovereignty. Unlike beautiful flowers, we have the capacity to
defend ourselves and each other against illegitimate interference, and our moral
status as personally sovereign creatures means that we are morally entitled to
make use of this capacity. Those who illegitimately interfere with us become
liable to defensive force, which is to say that at least temporarily, they lose
some of their rights to non-interference. Enforcement rights held against liable
attackers do not limit the authority each of us enjoys over their territory: by
disrespecting the moral status of others, attackers choose to make themselves
more violable; they cause their moral status to be diminished, so that the proper
moral order may be restored.38
The situation is different with enforcement rights against innocent bystanders.
Because innocent bystanders have done nothing to become liable to defensive
force, enforcement rights held against them would impose limits on the authority
we enjoy over ourselves, and would thus encroach on the core value of personal
sovereignty. It follows that rights against innocent bystanders need to be ex-
cluded from the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty. To strengthen
personal sovereignty is to give each innocent individual more authority over him-
or herself, not to restrict that authority in order to give individuals rights over
each other.
If making it permissible to harm innocent bystanders does not increase
personal sovereignty, then making our rights to non-interference permissibly
infringeable for minimization’s sake does not increase personal sovereignty, and
the inviolability approach does not suffer from the fatal flaw imputed to it by
the enforceability criticism.
Crucially, none of this is to say that we should be maximally inviolable, or
that it should never be permissible to harm innocent bystanders against their
consent. As I have suggested in section 4, other values may sometimes conflict
with the value of personal sovereignty, in which case either value may win out.
The only thing that I have tried to show here is that we cannot strengthen
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personal sovereignty by making it permissible to harm innocent bystanders. If
the core idea of some value is that individuals should have certain rights, we
cannot promote that value by curtailing these very rights.
7 Effective Rights to Non-Interference
Even if the enforceability criticism fails, a structurally similar criticism still
looms large. It starts from the observation that if personal sovereignty is simply
a matter of our moral status, then being personally sovereign—just like being
inviolable—should not be our exclusive concern insofar as we are rational beings.
In section 4, I have argued—following a long line of thinkers inspired by Kant—
that insofar as we are rational beings, we value autonomy, and that personal
sovereignty is an important aspect of autonomy. But if personal sovereignty
is merely an aspect of autonomy, then other considerations are important for
autonomy as well. Someone could argue as follows: “To lead an autonomous
life, we must be able to count on not being interfered with against our consent.
If others frequently interfere with us against our consent, or if they inflict grave
harm on us, our autonomy is undermined. It is thus an important aspect
of leading an autonomous life that we have largely effective rights to non-
interference. Rights to non-interference and enforcement rights are important
not only because they give expression to the fact that we are sovereign beings
who are morally entitled to lead an autonomous life; they are important also
insofar as they allow us to ensure that we will not in fact be interfered with
against our consent.39 All things considered, we may lead more autonomous
lives if we have less extensive rights to non-interference that we are more often
permitted to enforce than if we have more extensive rights that we are less often
permitted to enforce.”
The basic thrust of this argument seems to me correct. If it is, then our
sovereignty should sometimes be limited not merely because as sentient crea-
tures, we care about the general welfare (see section 4), but also because as ra-
tional creatures, we care about the effectiveness of our rights to non-interference.
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Consider the following example. Intuitively, it clearly seems permissible to step
on someone’s toes against that person’s consent to save five people from being
killed by a vicious murderer. If this intuitive judgment is correct, our sovereignty
is less than absolute. On the one hand, it seems justified that our sovereignty
should be limited in this way because of the large net gain in welfare this allows
us to bring about (see section 4). On the other hand, it also seems justified that
our sovereignty should be limited in this way for autonomy’s sake. By trying
to kill the five, the vicious murderer arrogates to himself a decision about their
fate. If we are permitted to stop him even though this involves trespassing on
someone’s body, then we are able to put the five back in control over their lives,
thus promoting their autonomy. Moreover, if the murderer manages to kill the
five, he robs them of all future opportunities to pursue their own plans and
projects. If we are permitted to stop him, we are able to preserve these future
opportunities for them, thus promoting their ability to lead a self-determined
life. It is true that our authority over our bodies is not as exclusive as it could
be if there are situations where we may step on someone’s toes against that
person’s consent. But this limitation does not seem to detract significantly
from our autonomy. Having even just a slightly better chance of not being
killed by a vicious murderer would seem to easily make up for it.
These considerations complicate the picture presented in section 4, which
gave the impression that personal sovereignty neatly captures our moral con-
cerns insofar as we are rational beings who aspire to autonomy. It clarifies that
the value of autonomy grounds a concern not only with what rights we have, but
also with what is done to us. When these two considerations come into conflict,
and when the latter carries more weight given the circumstances of the case,
we should think of personal sovereignty as limited for autonomy’s sake. This
more complex picture need not undermine the inviolability approach, but it has
the potential to do so. More precisely, it creates a problem for the inviolability
approach just in case it is true that our autonomy is all things considered best
advanced if our rights to non-interference are always permissibly infringeable
for minimization’s sake. Is this the case?
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Consider again the Murder Trolley Case. Intuitively, it seems wrong to
push the massive man. Can we make sense of this intuition if rights to non-
interference should always be permissibly infringeable when this would on bal-
ance promote our autonomy?
One striking feature of the Murder Trolley Case is that if you kill the massive
man, you use him as a means to save the five people trapped on the trolley
track. If we agree with Quinn that as a rational being, the massive man is
not a mere “cell in the collective whole,” but a “being in his own right” who
ought to be recognized as such, we may feel that sacrificing him for the sake of
the five would be especially abominable, so that morality ought not to endorse
it. But even if pushing the massive man would show an especially blatant
disregard for his autonomy, it is not clear that it should therefore be ruled
out as impermissible. After all, it would save five people from having their
autonomy blatantly disregarded by a murderer who is trying to kill them for his
sick pleasure. It is true that if the five are killed, they are killed impermissibly—
their moral status marks them out as beings who must not be killed for the thrill
of it. But how significant is this consideration?40
I believe that it is an important consideration for two reasons. The first
is coherentist in nature. If at least part of the purpose of our rights to non-
interference is to express the fact that we are morally entitled not to be interfered
with in certain ways, then we can make sense of our intuitive judgments about
cases such as the Murder Trolley Case, and are thereby provided with a reason
to trust them. Our considered judgements in turn give us reason to endorse the
idea which is able to explain these judgements.
But we need not stop at this narrow reflective equilibrium. If our personal
sovereignty matters not only to the extent that it provides us with effective
rights to non-interference, then our moral rules would seem to reflect the fact
that a human person is a particular kind of moral creature whom it is morally
appropriate not to treat in certain ways—to some extent regardless of the
consequences. This idea is independently plausible and powerful. It accurately
expresses at least one way in which we tend to think about ourselves and others
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from a moral point of view.
8 Conclusion
If our moral rights to non-interference are not always permissibly infringeable
for minimization’s sake, we are more inviolable than we would otherwise be.
According to the inviolability approach to solving the paradox of deontology,
this is something we value, as it promotes our autonomy by putting us in charge
of our own lives.
The enforceability criticism of the inviolability approach proceeds from the
assumption that we are truly in charge of our lives only if we are permitted to
defend ourselves against illegitimate interference. From this, it infers that our
inviolability is valuable primarily insofar as it adds to our personal sovereignty,
where personal sovereignty consists of an inviolability as well as an enforceability
dimension. I have argued that these ideas are correct.
The enforceability criticism threatens to undermine the inviolability approach
because it contends that the enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty
includes enforcement rights not only against liable attackers, but against un-
involved third parties as well. If this were the case, our sovereignty would all
things considered be higher if our rights to non-interference followed a mini-
mization logic. But I have argued that the enforceability dimension of personal
sovereignty is necessarily limited to enforcement rights held against liable at-
tackers, and that the enforceability criticism therefore fails. To extend the
enforceability dimension of personal sovereignty to enforcement rights against
innocent third parties is to assume that we can become more sovereign as the
rightful control each of us enjoys over their territory becomes less exclusive.
This assumption is not tenable.
There is, however, a further complication. Insofar as we value autonomy, we
care about rights to non-interference and enforcement rights partly because they
allow us to effectively control whether we are being interfered with. I have shown
that this fact is consistent with the inviolability approach, as it does not preclude
18
that there is independent value in our being entitled to non-interference.
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